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JURISDICTION OVER ALIENS
By DAVID YOUNG*

DOES MORGAN CLARIFY THE LAW?
For the first time in fifty years Canada's highest judicial tribunal has
been called to examine and rule on constitutional jurisdiction over aliens. In
the recent case of Morgan and Jacobson v. Attorney-General of Prince
Edward Island and Leo Blacquiere et al.,' the Chief Justice, on behalf of a
unanimous Supreme Court, upheld a provincial statute restricting sales of
land to non-residents.
The case arose out of an attempt by two citizens of the United States,
resident in Rochester, New York, to purchase a parcel of land in Prince
County, Prince Edward Island. The Registrar of the County refused to register
the deed of conveyance because of s. 3 of the Real Property Act.2 The
appellants brought an action for a declaratory judgment that the legislation
was ultra vires and for a writ of mandamus against the Registrar. By order
of Bell, J., the question of the constitutionality of the legislation was referred
to the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island in banco.3
In the provincial Supreme Court the appellants argued that the legislation entrenched on the exclusive authority of Parliament to legislate in relation
to naturalization and aliens under s. 91(25) of the British North America
Act, 1867, and conflicted with s. 24(1) of the Canadian Citizenship Act,
and with the Real and Personal Property Convention, 1899 between Her
Majesty and the United States, made applicable to Canada by a convention
of October 21, 1921. Trainor, C.J., speaking for the Court, ruled against the
appellants on all three grounds, holding that s. 3 was legislation in relation to
property and civil rights in the Province.4 The appellants took their case to
the Supreme Court of Canada.
In the Supreme Court the appellants relied entirely on the first and
second grounds of attack, opting not to press the argument of conflict with
treaty obligations. They were supported in their case by the Attorney-General
of Canada as an intervenant, while the Attorney-General of Prince Edward
Island was joined by the Attorneys-General of the other nine provinces as
intervenants. The case was heard by the full court of nine judges.
The in*pugned legislation read as follows:
3. (1) Persons who are not Canadian citizens may take, acquire, hold, convey,
transmit, or otherwise dispose of, real property in the Province of Prince

* Mr. Young is a member of the 1975 graduating class, Osgoode Hall Law School.

126 June, 1975, as yet unreported.
2 R.S.P.E.I. 1951, c. 138, as amended by S.P.E.L 1972, c. 49, s. 1.
3 Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island, 5 February, 1973.
(1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 603 (P.E.I.S.C.).
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Edward Island subject to the provisions of sub-section two (2) here next
following.
(2) Unless he receives permission so to do from the Lieutenant-Governor-inCouncil, no person who is not a resident of the Province of Prince Edward
Island shall take, acquire, hold or in any other manner receive, either himself,
or through a trustee, corporation, or any such like, title to any real property
in the Province of Prince Edward Island the aggregate total of which has a
shore frontage in excess of five (5) chains.
(3) The grant of any such' permission shall be at the discretion of the
Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council, who shall notify the applicant in writing by
means of a certified copy of an Order-in-Council of his decision within a
reasonable time.
(4) An application for any such permission shall be in the form prescribed,
from time to time, by the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council.
(5)(a) For the purposes of this section, "Canadian citizen" means persons
defined as Canadian citizens by the Canadian Citizenship Act (R.S.C. 1970,
Vol. 1, Cap.C-19).
(b) For the purposes of this section "resident" of the Province of Prince
Edward Island means a bona fide resident, animus et factum, of the
Province of Prince Edward Island.
(c) For the purposes of this section "corporation" means any company,
corporation, or other body corporate and politic, and any association,
syndicate, or other body, and any such the like, and the heirs, executors,
administrators, and curators, or other legal representatives of such person, as such is defined and included by The Domiciled Companies Act
(Laws of Prince Edward Island 1962).

The statute is successor to legislation dating from before Confederation,
which abolished the common law disability of aliens to hold land but limited
their holdings to a maximum of two hundred acres. 5 That legislation remained unchanged until 1939 when the words "except with the consent of
the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council" were added. 6 In 1964 the limitation
was amended to 10 acres or 5 chains of shore frontage. 7
The pre-1972 legislation was never challenged in the courts. However,
Trainor, C.J., in the provincial Supreme Court, suggested that after 1867 the
legislation was probably invalid as being in pith and substance legislation
respecting aliens and therefore beyond the powers of the Province.8 The
implied distinction with the 1972 statute was that the former, being legislation
respecting aliens had invaded the federal jurisdiction while the latter, using
the broader criterion of residence, had not.
Absentee ownership of land has been a matter of great concern in Prince
Edward Island since before Confederation. Chief Justice Trainor, who clearly
felt that such ownership was a proper subject of provincial jurisdiction suggested that the primary factor which instigated passage of the 1972 legislation
was the danger of large portions of the island's recreational and vacation land
falling under the control of non-resident owners 9 This concern had been
5

An Act to Enable Aliens to Hold Real Estate, S.P.E.I. 1859, c. 4.
6 S.P.E.I. 1939, c. 44.
7 S.P.E.I. 1964, c. 27, s. 1.
8 Supra, note 4 at 607.
9Id.
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identified by a Special Legislative Committee whose report preceded the
legislation as well as by a Royal Commission set up to study the whole question. The Royal Commission's Interim Report identified as dangers of nonresident ownership declining agriculture, destruction of the countryside by the
haphazard spread of summer cottages which remain unoccupied for most of
the year, and a rising price of land making it impossible for the next generation of island residents to buy land. All these problems exist whether the nonresident purchasers are American or Canadian. 10
The implications of absentee ownership have been the subject of scrutiny
and legislation in other provinces as well, particularly over the past five
years." However, the concerns there have been primarily in relation to land
holding by those who were mere aliens, rather than those who were nonresidents. Nevertheless, the interests of all the other provinces in the outcome
of the Morgan appeal were clearly demonstrated by their interventions therein
on behalf of Prince Edward Island.
CAN A PROVINCE DISCRIMINATE AMONG
CITIZENS AND AMONG ALIENS?
Parliament clearly has juriscaction to legislate with respect to citizenship.
The power derives either by implication from the general power granted in
the opening words of s. 91 or from the express words of s. 91 (25).12 Parliament may define the status of citizen and may determine to who and by
what means the status is granted. In a similar manner Parliament has jurisdiction over aliens, deriving from the head of power found in s. 91(25). This
much has never seriously been disputed and was not at issue in Morgan
However, certain questions have remained unanswered since the naturalization" and aliens power was first considered in 1899. These were, how far
beyond this "definitional" power may Parliament go in investing the status of
citizen or alien with attributes that conflict with provincial legislation, and
what limitation is there imposed on provincial legislative power as a result of
a person being clothed with the status?
The narrow question posed in the Morgan case was whether the province under its property and civil rights power in s. 92(13) could discriminate
10

See Prince Edward Island Legislature, Report of the Special Legislative Committee on Land Acquisition, (Charlottetown: 1971); and Royal Commission on Land
Ownership and Land Use, Interim Report (Charlottetown: January, 1973).
11 See, e.g., Ontario Legislature, Interim Report of the Select Committee on
Economic and Cultural Nationalism: Foreign Ownership of Ontario Real Estate,
(Queen's Printer, Toronto: 1973); Alberta Legislature, Select Committee on Foreign
Investment: Interim Report on Public and Private Lands (Edmonton: 1972); Saskatchewan Legislative Assembly, Final Report of the Special Committee on the Ownership
of Agricultural Lands (Regina: March 1973);; as for legislative activity see: Public
Lands Act, R.S.O. 1971, c. 380, as amended by S.O. 1971, c. 46, and Land Transfer
Tax Act, R.S.O. 1971, c. 235 as amended by S.O. 1974, cc. 8, 16, 93; An Act to Regulate the Ownership and Control of Agricultural Land in Saskatchewan, S.S. 1973-74,
c. 98; Land Holdings Disclosure Act, S.N.S. 1969, c. 13.
12 See judgment of Rand, J. in Winner v. S.M.T. (Eastern) Ltd., [1951] S.C.R. 887
at 918.
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between residents and non-residents with respect to landholding in the province as the impugned legislation purported to do. The appellants argued that
in so legislating the province had entrenched on the exclusive jurisdiction of
Parliament to define the status and to legislate in respect to the essential
attributes of citizenship and alienage. An essential attribute of citizenship, it
was argued, is that all citizens of Canada residing without a province should
have the same capacity as persons residing within the province, that only
Parliament can alter this equality of capacity; similarly, only Parliament can
alter the capacity of aliens. In fact, it was submitted, aliens benefit from the
same rights as citizens as a result of s. 24 of the Citizenship Act. The section
reads as follows:
24(1) Real and personal property of every description may be taken, acquired,
held and disposed of by an alien in the same manner in all respects as by a
natural-born Canadian citizen; and title to real and personal property of every
description may be derived through, from or in succession to an alien in the same
manner in all respects as through, from or in succession to a natural-born Canadian citizen.
(2) This section does not operate so as to
(a) qualify an alien for any office or for any municipal, parliamentary or
other franchise;
(b) qualify an alien to be the owner of a Canadian ship;
(c) entitle an alien to any right or privilege as a Canadian citizen except
such rights and privileges in respect of property as are hereby expressly
given to him; or
(d) affect an estate or interest in real or personal property to which any
person has or may become entitled, either mediately or immediately,
in possession or expectancy, in pursuance of any disposition made before
the 4th day of July, 1883, or in pursuance of any devolution by law
on the death of any person dying before that day. R.S.C. 1970, c. 33,
s.24.

In sum, the appellants submitted, s. 3 was legislation in pith and substance discriminating against non-resident citizens and aliens, something which
only Parliament had the power to do. As such it conflicted with s. 24 of the
Citizenship Act. In any case they submitted, s. 3 of the Real Property Act
was in pith and substance in relation to naturalization and aliens within
s. 91 (25) and was therefore ultra vires.
To succeed the appellants had to deal with the case of Walter v. Attorney-General of Alberta,'s relied upon strongly by the respondents in
Morgan. In that case provincial legislation which sought to regulate further
acquisitions of land by colonies of Hutterites, (a religious sect whose members held land communally) was upheld. In addition to regulating further
acquisitions by colonies already resident in the province, the statute prohibited absolutely acquisitions by non-resident colonies.14 The challenge to
the legislation was that it related to religion, a subject within federal jurisdiction, and was therefore invalid. Declining to decide the question of jurisdiction
over religion, Martland, J., speaking for the court, held that the legislation
was in pith and substance in relation to the ownership of land within the
Is [1969] S.C.R. 383.
14

The Communal Property Act, R.S.A. 1955, c. 52, as amended.
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province and therefore within the competence of the legislature. The statute,
his Lordship ruled, was not directed at controlling the religious beliefs of the
Hutterites but at the practice of holding large areas of Alberta land as
communal property.
In Walter it may be noted, the legislation was upheld in spite of being
directed at a particular class of persons. The conclusion might therefore be
drawn, by implication, that a province can validly restrict landholding by
non-resident Canadian citizens, as well as by aliens.' 5 Thus only if the legislation can be said to be in relation to a class of subject within exclusive federal
jurisdiction would it be invalid. The respondents in Morgan sought to interpret the Walter decision in these terms. The appellants in Morgan, however,
sought to distinguish the case. The argument was made that the Alberta
legislation was of general application imposing restrictions on all persons
whether they be residents within or without the province, as to the manner
in which they could hold land as community property. As such, it was submitted, it could be contrasted with the P.E.I. legislation: the latter could not
be said to be of general application but affected only certain persons; it was
not in pith and substance legislation in relation to property and civil rights in
the province. The purpose of s. 3, it was submitted, was to change an essential element of the status of non-resident citizens and aliens, as opposed to
regulating the manner in which property was held.
Chief Justice Laskin rejected this suggested interpretation of the Walter
decision. Referring to the Alberta legislation his Lordship said:
It is true that no differentiation was expressly made on the basis of residence or
citizenship or alienage, and that all who fell within the regulated groups were
treated alike. Yet it is also clear that the definition of the regulated bodies of
persons was for the province, and if the province could determine who could
hold or the extent to which land could be held according to whether a communal property regime was observed, it is difficult to see why the province could
not equally determine the extent of permitted holdings on the basis of residence.10

Laskin, C.J. thus construed the Walter decision broadly: a province may
regulate not only the manner by which land is held but also the groups of
persons who own land.
The learned Chief Justice furthermore rejected the contention that because of the discriminatory nature of the legislation it must be regarded as in
pith and substance in relation to citizenship and to aliens.
I do not agree with this characterization and I do not think it is supportable
either in principle or under any case law. No one is prevented by Prince Edward
17
Island legislation from entering the province and from taking up residence there.

The assertion that "no one is prevented.., from entering the province" is
15 It was admitted at trial in the case that two of the plaintiffs were U.S. citizens
resident in Alberta. The legislation prohibited the acquisition of land in Alberta by
persons communally owning land outside Alberta. It should be assumed it was argued
in Morgan that some of these persons were Canadian citizens resident outside Alberta.

10 Supra, note 1 at 9.
17 Id. at 8.

1975]

Case Comment

suggestive of the dominant theme throughout the Morgan decision: provincial
legislation is valid so long as it does not have the effect of closing provincial
borders to entry. The principle stems from a well-known dictum of Rand, J.,
in the case of Winner v. S.M.T. (Eastern) Ltd.' s where the learned judge
stated:
A province cannot prevent a Canadian from entering it except, conceivably, in
temporary circumstances, for some local reason, as for example health.

Rand, J., discussing the status of citizenship, went on to draw a line between
"incidents of status" and "elements or attributes necessarily involved in the
status itself". The freedom to enter any province, to live and to earn a living
there, his Lordship suggested, is an attribute of the status of citizenship which
is beyond nullification by provincial action. 19
Chief Justice Laskin, in supporting a broad interpretation of Walter,
appears to suggest that a restriction on landholding placed on any group of
persons, aliens or citizens, residents or non-residents, does not constitute a
closing of provincial borders. However, in the application of Rand's principle
-to the facts in Morgan, his Lordship does not find it necessary to base his
decision on such a broad ground. The legislation, he rules is directed solely
at non-residents and "no one is prevented from . . .taking up residence

there". Furthermore, he states, s. 3 merely placed restrictions on the ownership of land by non-residents, it does not prohibit it entirely. One must query
if legislation prohibiting absolutely the acquisition of land by aliens, or by
citizens, were enacted by a provincial government whether it would not be
depriving the persons of the means to earn a living and to live in the province.
While this broad interpretation of the Walter decision might well have
resolved the question in Morgan, Chief Justice Laskin saw fit to treat separately the argument that s. 3, in purporting to alter the capacity of aliens to
hold land, had entrenched on Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction under
s. 91(25), and was in direct conflict with s. 24 of the Citizenship Act.
His Lordship suggested initially that the question of jurisdiction over
capacity of aliens might be resolved by a "paramountcy" approach. Referring
to the forerunner of s. 24, s. 4 of the Naturalizationand Aliens Act (1881)
(Can.), c. 13, his Lordship indicated that it was open to any province, following Confederation, to pass legislation enabling aliens to own land, in the
absence of federal legislation restricting that capacity:
Simply because it is for Parliament to legislate in relation, to aliens does not
mean that it alone can give an alien capacity to buy or hold land in a province
or take it by devise or by descent. No doubt, Parliament alone may withhold or
deny capacity of an alien to hold land or deny capacity to an alien in any other
respect, but if it does not, I see no ground upon which provincial legislation
recognizing capacity in respect of the holding of land can be held invalid. 20

S. 3 of the Prince Edward Island statute is in fact the successor to legislaIsSupra, note 12 at 920.
19 Id.
2
o Supra, note 1 at 10.
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tion, pre-dating Confederation, with precisely this purpose. 21 Such a purpose
was contained in subsection (1) of the impugned section. However, subsection (2) went on to place restrictions on the exercise of this general capacity
by certain aliens, to wit, those who did not reside in the province. Thus, the
question in Morgan was:
whether s. 24(1) of the Canadian Citizenship Act, as an affirmative exercise of
the power of Parliament in relation to aliens, obliges a province to treat nonresident aliens (and citizens can surely be on no worse footing) on a basis of
22
equality with resident aliens.

To answer this question his Lordship proceeded to consider the scope of the
federal aliens power.
SCOPE OF THE ALIENS POWER
The law on the aliens power was laid down some seventy years ago in
two British Columbia cases. 23 The issue in both cases concerned discriminatory
legislation affecting Chinese immigrants. In one case the legislation was struck
down, in the other it was upheld. While they can be distinguished on their
facts the two cases produced inconsistent statements of principle. Subsequent
authority was not extremely helpful in clarifying the position. As controls
over foreign investment, and, in particular the ownership of land, were proposed at both federal and provincial levels during the late 1960's and early
1970's, questions were raised as to constitutional jurisdiction. 24 Morgan,
being the first direct test of the aliens power in over fifty years, was looked
to as an important prospective clarification of the law, at least with respect
to control of foreign land ownership. 25
The first time the Privy Council considered the federal aliens power was
in the case of Union Colliery Co. v. Bryden. 26 The impugned legislation in
that case, s. 4 of the British Columbia Coal Mines Legislation Act, 1890,27
read as follows:
No boy under the age of twelve years, and no woman or girl of any age and no
Chinaman shall be employed in or allowed to be for the purpose of employment
in any mine to which the Act applies, below ground.

The Privy Council, construing the word "Chinaman" to mean all Chinese
whether aliens or naturalized citizens, 28 found the provision to be in pith and
substance in relation to aliens and naturalized subjects and therefore invading
2

1 Supra, note 5.

22

Supra, note 1 at 11.

Union Colliery Co. v. Bryden, [1899] A.C. 580; Cunningham v. Tomey Homma,
[1903] A.C. 151.
24
See, J.E. Arnett, Canadian Regulation of Foreign Investment the Legal Parameters, (1972), 50 C.B.R. 211; and John Spencer, The Alien Landowner in Canada,
(1973), 51 C.B.R. 389.
23

See comments, supra, re provincial initiatives, note 11.
26 Supra, note 23.
27 R.S.B.C. 1897, c.138, s. 4.
28
Thus leaving open the question of whether the aliens' power applied to members
25

of racial rather than national groups.
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the exclusive federal power under s. 91(25). Lord Watson, speaking on
behalf of the Board indicated that the naturalization power was broad indeed:
.. . it seems prima facie to include the power of enacting what shall be the
consequences of naturalization, or in other words, what shall be the rights and
privileges pertaining to residents in Canada after they have been naturalized. 2 9

His Lordship went on:
Their Lordships see no reason to doubt that by virtue of s. 91, sub-s. 25, the
legislature of the Dominion is invested with exclusive authority in all matters
which directly concern the rights, privileges and disabilites of the class of Chinamen who are resident in the provinces of Canada. 30

This far-reaching statement, if left untouched, would probably have resolved
the issue. However, the Judicial Committee considered the aliens' power

again four years later and, in doing so, apparently retreated from its position
in Bryden.

In Cunningham v. Tomey Homma,3 1 their Lordships were asked to consider the validity of a British provincial law which prevented Asians from
being registered on the voters' list in any provincial election.32 The Lord
Chancellor, Earl of Halsbury, speaking for the Privy Council Board, found
that the legislation was not in pith and substance in relation to aliens or
naturalization but was validly enacted under s. 92(1) of the British North
America Act which authorizes the province to amend its own constitution.
He went on to define the extent of the federal power in s. 91 (25):
The truth is that the language of that section does not purport to deal with the
consequences of either alienage or naturalization. It undoubtedly reserves these
subjects for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Dominion - that is to say, it is for
the Dominion to determine what shall constitute either the one or the other, but
the question as to what consequences shall follow from either is not touched: The
right of protection and the obligations of allegiance are necessarily involved in
the nationality conferred by naturalization; but the privileges attached
to it, where
these depend upon residence, are quite independent of nationality. 33

This dictum as a statement of the law was clearly inconsistent with that of
Lord Watson in Bryden's case. In the earlier case the learned law lord suggested that the federal jurisdiction not only included the power to define the
status of alienage or citizenship but also to govern the consequences thereof the rights, privileges, and disabilities pursuant to the status. In the later case,
however, Lord Halsbury clearly drew the line between definition of the status
and the consequences thereof, a distinction which apparently was analogous
to that between rights and privileges.
While it might be possible to argue that Tomey Homma's case, being
the more recent, overruled Bryden's, the Lord Chancellor did not see fit to
29

Supra, note 23 at 586.
30 Id. at 587.
8l Supra, note 23.
3

2ProvincialElections Act R.S.B.C. 1897, c. 67.

33

Supra, note 23 at 156-57.
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disapprove of it explicitly. He merely distinguished the earlier case on the
facts:
That case depended on totally different grounds. This Board dealing with the
particular facts of that case came to the conclusion that the regulations there impeached were not really aimed at the regulation of coal mines at all, but were
in truth devised to deprive the Chinese, naturalized or not, of the ordinary rights
of the inhabitants of British Columbia and, in effect, to prohibit their continued
residence in that province, since it prohibited their earning their living in that
province. It is obvious that such a decision can have no relation to the question
whether any naturalized person has an inherent right to the suffrage within the
34
province in which he resides.

The aliens power was considered again eleven years later by the Supreme
Court of Canada. In Quong-Wing v. The King,3 5 a Saskatchewan statute
forbidding the employment of white women by Asians was challenged. The
Supreme Court upheld the legislation. Mr. Justice Duff found that the statute
was not in pith and substance in relation to aliens. While this would have
sufficiently disposed of the question his Lordship went on the consider which
of two earlier cases was the law. He suggested that:
in applying Bryden's Case we are not entitled to pass over the authoritative
interpretation of that decision which was pronounced some years later by the
Judicial Committee itself in Cunningham v. Tomey Homma. . .36
...

His Lordship continued:
we should not be entitled to adopt and act upon a view as to the construction
of item 25 of section 91 (B.N.A. Act) which was distinctly and categorically
rejected in the later judgment.37
...

Such an interpretation, it is submitted, clearly was not warranted by the
actual language of the judgment. As pointed out above, the extent of the
"interpretation" which the Privy Council made in Tomey Homno's case
consisted of no more than a distinction of the earlier case on the facts. For
this reason, apart from being obiter, his Lordship's remarks should not be
taken as authority for the proposition that Bryden was overruled by the
38
later case.
The Privy Council itself in subsequent decisions appears to have treated
both Bryden's and Tomey Homma's cases as good law. Their Lordships considered the aliens power for the last time when in a pair of related cases the
power of the British Columbia government to restrict employment of aliens
on Crown lands was challenged. 3 In the first case Bryden was again distinguished on the facts: the provincial statute was found to relate to the
regulation of public property in the province and not to aliens and was there84 Id.at 157.
B5 [1914] S.C.R. 440.
86 Id. at 466.
37 Id. at 486.
28 The point is made here because the Chief Justice in Morgan appears to rely on
Duff, J.'s dictum as authority for finding that Bryden was overruled by later authority.
39
Brooks-Bidlake and Whittal Ltd. v. A.-G. B.C., [1923] A.C. 450 and A.-G. B.C.

v. A.-G. Canada, [1924] A.C. 203.
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fore a valid exercise of legislative power. 40 In the second case on a general
reference by the Governor-General, the statute was struck down as being in
contravention of a 1913 treaty between Canada and Japan. While not applied, the two earlier cases were again referred to without any indication of
disapproval of one or the other. 4 1 In these two cases and in other decisions,4
the Privy Council appears to have treated Bryden's case as standing for the

proposition that a statute which is nominally directed at a valid provincial
object but which in pith and substance relates to a class of subjects within
federal jurisdiction is ultra vires. This is clearly the interpretation placed on
Bryden's case by Lord Halsbury in Tomey Homma.
Possibly the most useful attempt at clarification of the aliens power,
prior to the Morgan decision, may be found in the well-known passage of
Rand, J. in the Winner case, referred to above, 43 where he discusses the
status of citizenship. In examining the two earliest British Columbia cases
his Lordship suggests that a distinction should be drawn between "incidents
of the status" and "elements necessarily involved in the status itself":
Citizenship is membership in a state; and in the citizen inhere those rights and
duties, the correlatives of allegiance and protection, which are basic to that
status....
But incidents of status must be distinguished from elements or attributes necessarily involved in status itself. British subjects have never enjoyed an equality in
all civil or political priviliges or immunities as is illustrated in Cunningham v.
Tomey Homma, in which the Judicial Committee maintained the right of British
Columbia to exclude a naturalized person from the electoral franchise. On the
other hand, in Bryden's case, a statute of the same province that forbade the
employment of Chinamen, aliens or naturalized, in underground mining operations, was found to be incompetent. As explained in Hommds case, that decision
is to be taken as determining,
"that the regulations there impeached were not really aimed at the regulation of
metal mines at all, but were in truth devised to deprive the Chinese, naturalized
or not, of the ordinary rights of the inhabitants of British Columbia and, in
effect, to prohibit their continued residence in that province, since it prohibited
their earning their living in that province".
What this implies is that a province cannot by depriving a Canadian of the means
of working, force him to leave it: it cannot divest him of his right or capacity
to remain and to engage in work there: that capacity inhering as a constituent
element of his citizenship status is beyond nullification by provincial action. The
contrary view would involve the anomaly that although British Columbia could
not by mere prohibition deprive a naturalized foreigner of his means of livelihood, it could do so to a native-born Canadian. He may, of course, disable himself from exercising his capacity or he may be regulated in it by valid provincial
law in other aspects. But that attribute of citizenship lies outside of those civil
rights committed to the province, and is analogous
to the capacity of a Dominion
corporation which the province cannot sterilize.44

As we have already seen, Chief Justice Laskin, in Morgan, reveals a
40

Brooks-Bidlake, id. at 457-58.
A.-G. D.C. v. A.-G. Canada,supra, note 39 at 211.
42
See John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton, [1915] A.C. 330 at 343-44 and BrooksBidlake, supra, note 39 at 457.
43
Supra, note 12 at 10.
44
1d. at 919-20.
41
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predilection for Rand, J.'s concepts of federal and provincial jurisdiction. 45
Strangely enough, however, his Lordship does not cite the above dictum as
an authority to be followed. He merely quotes it, early on in his judgment,
more to serve as a statement of the issues before him.46 Nor does the learned
Chief Justice expressly adopt Rand, J.'s "incidents" and "elements" distinction. Instead, his Lordship adopts the Tomey Homma view of the law, and
implicitly therefore the distinction between definition, of and consequences
to, status. However, even these concepts are not developed as a framework
or applied to the facts of the case.
While his Lordship articulates a rule which draws heavily on Rand, J.'s
"closing provincial borders" concept, he appears in the end to apply very
much the sort of pith and substance test to be found in Bryden's case. It will
be remembered that s. 3 places restrictions on non-residents, not on aliens
per se. Distinguishing Bryden's case, his Lordship suggests that it
is a far different case from the present, which does not involve any attempt,
direct or indirect, either to exclude aliens from Prince Edward Island or to drive
4
out any aliens now residing there.

7

His Lordship goes on to state that in his appraisal there is no attempt here
to regulate or control alien residents of the province but simply a limitation
on the landholding of the broader class, non-residents. The true test, he
suggests, is one of pith and substance:
The question that would have to be answered is whether the provincial legislation,
though apparently or avowedly related to an object within provincial competence,
is not in truth directed to, say, aliens or naturalized persons so as make it
legislation striking at their general capacity or legislation
so discriminatory against
them as in effect to amount to the same thing.48
His Lordship finds that no such sterilization results from the impugned
legislation.
The analogy between aliens and federally-incorporated companies, cited
by Rand, J. in Winner, had been articulated initially in a number of Privy
Council decisions defining the federal incorporation power.49 Chief Justice
Laskin also draws on the analogy, and applies it to the facts in Morgan.
Federal companies, it will be remembered, are subject to valid provincial
regulatory legislation and are entitled to no special immunity over provincial
corporations so long as their capacity to establish themselves as viable corporate entities is not precluded by the provincial legislation. In like manner,
his Lordship suggests non-resident aliens are entitled to no special immunity
over other classes of non-residents simply because the provincial regulatory
legislation may affect one class more than another with what may be thought
to be undue stringency. The concept is again strongly reminiscent of Rand, I.
4

1 Supra, note 1 at 11.
46Id. at 7, 8.
4

7 Id.

at 14.
at 16.
49 John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton, supra, note 42; Great West Saddlery v. The
King, [1921] 2 A.C. 91.
48 Id.
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in Winner. Closing provincial borders to entry is the equivalent to sterilization
of a citizen's or an alien's general capacity. It is at that point where provincial
jurisdiction terminates. However, Prince Edward Island has not gone that far.
His Lordship concludes that the residency requirement, affecting both aliens
and citizens alike, can in no way be regarded as a sterilization of the general
capacity of an alien or citizen who is a non-resident especially when there is
no attempt to seal off provincial borders against entry.5 0 Thus Chief Justice
Laskin's framework is essentially this: Parliament's jurisdiction extends to
definition of the status of alien and citizen; the borderline between definition
and consequences (or elements and incidents if you like) is sterilization of
general capacity. How is it determined? By that age-old yardstick (meter
stick, now!) of Canadian constitutional law, pith and substance.
In conclusion, his Lordship states that federal power as exercised in
s. 24 of the Citizenship Act, or as it might otherwise be exercised, may not
be invoked to give aliens, naturalized persons or natural born citizens any
immunity over provincial regulatory legislation. Thus s. 3 of the Real Property
Act neither occupies the same ground as s. 24 of the Citizenship Act nor
entrenches on any legitimate federal jurisdiction.
THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
The decision in Morgan and Jacobson is striking in two respects. First
and most evidently it represents a strong statement from out highest court
for provincial primacy in an area where hitherto considerable doubt existed
as to jurisdiction. The unanimity of the full nine judges, as articulated by the
Chief Justice is an unequivocal indication of the court's position: the province
should have jurisdiction in the regulation of all aspects of land ownership
within its borders. In upholding the P.E.I. legislation, the Court has sanctioned a formula whereby all provinces can effectively control alien landownership, albeit "through the back door". What is disturbing, however, about
the decision in Morgan is the apparent unwillingness of the court to discuss,
or at least recognize, that landownership can no longer be considered a
constitutive characteristic of Canadian citizenship.
Despite a subsequent disclaimer regarding the Court's concern with the
wisdom of the legislation, his Lordship echoes Trainor, C.J. and the various
provincial study groups when he states:
Absentee ownership of land in a province is a matter of legitimate provincial
Island, history adds force to this
concern and, in the case of Prince Edward
aspect of its authority over it territory.51
While the concerns in Prince Edward Island can be appreciated, at what cost?
The result of the Morgan decision it is submitted is as follows. If all
other provinces do in fact adopt P.E.I.-type legislation (in most cases as a
"back door" means of regulating alien landholding), then Canadians will
find themselves in no better position than foreigners when seeking to buy
50

Supra, note 1 at 17.
51 Id. at 8-9.
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land in any province but their own. In sum, they will be little better than
"provincial citizens" when it comes to landownership.
Chief Justice Laskin declines to discuss these implications of his decision.
However, it appears that he feels implicitly confronted with them. It will be
remembered that his Lordship cites Rand J.'s proposition "that a province
cannot prevent a Canadian from entering it except, conceivably, in temporary
circumstances, for some local reason".52 His preoccupation with demonstrating that provincial borders are not closed suggests that his Lordship
remains uncomfrontable with the dictum, in spite of his attempts to distinguish
it. And rightly so. The Winner case involved an American citizen operating
an interprovincial bus line through New Brunswick. It was held that the
province had no right to bar entry to a citizen of Canada; nor could it bar
entry to the citizen of a foreign country who, for all practical purposes, enjoys
the same rights. There was no question of residence; however, it is clear from
the case that "entry" was perceived as no more than the crossing of the border
by the appellant's vehicles. A provincial law which sought to regulate this
activity was struck down; there was no question of residence. Why in Morgan
should entry be equated with establishing residence "bona fide, animus et
factum"?53 It is submitted that the movement of capital into or the establishment of a business in a province is just as much of a crossing of provincial
borders as that of taking up residence. Why should acquisition of land by
non-residents be any different?
His Lordship omits reference to the sentence immediately following
Rand, J.'s famous dictum, a sentence which surely must have been urged
upon him:
With such a prohibitory power, the country could be converted into a number of
enclaves, and the 'union' which the original provinces sought and obtained,
54
disrupted.

Unhappily the Morgan decision is suggestive of precisely
"Balkanization".

such a

The second striking aspect of the Morgan decision is its failure to clarify
significantly the alien's power. In the well-known passage cited, Mr. Justice
Rand sought to identify the "local reason" for which a province could validly
prevent a citizen from entry. As we saw above he examined the aliens cases
and concluded that such local reason was analogous to the province's jurisdiction to regulate federal companies - it cannot sterilize them. Chief Justice
Laskin picks up the analogy. Uneasy with the "residence" basis for circumventing Rand, J.'s rule his Lordship seeks to found his decision on a surer
ground: that the impugned legislation does not in any case sterilize the nonresident's general capacity. He characterizes the statute as a "limitation on
the size of landholding", rather than an outright prohibition of the purchase
of land by non-residents.
5

2 Supra, note 12 at 920.
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3 Supra, note 2, s. 3(5) (6).
4 Supra, note 12 at 918.
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It is here that we must register the strongest dissatisfaction with the
Morgan decision. His Lordship disappoints our expectations for a definitive
statement of the aliens power. Instead, various aspects of the statutory provision are relied on in toto to find that the legislation, in pith and substance,
is not in relation to aliens and naturalization. But there is no articulation of
the limits of the test. What if the statute had been directed solely at aliens?
(or, as it might be argued, similar legislation in British Columbia or Ontario
will in reality be intended)? What if the statute had prohibited all landholding
by non-residents? 55 His Lordship as we know is not disposed to answering
hypothetical questions. 56 However, his reliance on pith and substance, a test
"dependent so largely on the judicial appraisal of the thrust of the particular
legislation" as his Lordship himself admits,5 7 must be disappointing to many
students of constitutional law.
In spite of these deficiences we may draw certain conclusions from the
decision. The Supreme Court clearly supports provincial primacy in the
regulation of landholding within a province. In other areas of the economy,
however, where it might be suggested Ottawa's leadership is more crucial, we
may posit that federal jurisdiction would be upheld. It may be argued, along
the lines suggested58 that Ottawa's power to regulate aliens per se may have
been enhanced by the Morgan decision. If this is so, reliance thereon in conjunction with the federal trade and commerce power, could see a future court
upholding Parliament's jurisdiction to control foreign investment generally
in Canada.
55
The analogy with federal companies could have been taken one step further to
resolve at least one of these questions. In Great West Saddlery v. The King, supra,
note 49, it was held that while a province could validly enact a mortmain statute which
would curtail the right of any corporation, federal or provincial, to hold land within
the province, it could not pass an Act limiting the right of a federal corporation alone
to hold land. On this basis it could be found that a restriction on landholding by aliens
per se strikes at their general capacity and is therefore beyond the powers of the
provincial legislature.
56 See A.-G. for Manitoba v. Manitoba Egg and Poultry Association et al, [1971]
S.C.R. 689 at 704. We may note that Laskin, CJ. furthermore declined to answer the
question "Who is a resident of Prince Edward Island?" He did not doubt that the
appellants in the present case were non-residents. However, the only definition cited by

his Lordship was that given in s. 3(5) (6) of the statute, "a bona fide resident, animus

et factum" which is not too helpful. Does this mean the future litigants will have to
look for assistance from other areas of law such as conflicts and taxation?
57
Supra, note 1 at 16.
58
Supra, note 55.

